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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
AN EVOLVING U.S. fARM AND FOOD POUCY: 
THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW COVENANT 
Overview: 
• U.S. farm and food policy is a politically bipartisan social covenant which evolves to reflect chanaing 
relationships among competing policy actors and their socioeconomic environment. 
• The farm and food policy covenant includes: (1) protection against low farm income via price supports 
and direct income payments, (2) protection against hip food expenditures via public stocks aDd 
domestic feeding programs, (3) protection against high federal budget costs by requiring farmen to 
remove land from production in order to qualify for farm program benefits, and (4) protection against 
resource degradation via technical assistance, cost sharing for soil erosion control, and environmental 
compliance provisions. 
Long Term Evolutionary Trends in Policy Instruments 
• Direct income payments to producers have largely replm:ed farm c01111'11Qt;/.it price supports as the 
policy i:nstr~~~Mnt used to protect against low farm income. 
- Price supports raise prices, thereby encouraging stock accumulation, discouraging exports, and 
discriminating against poor consumers, who spend more of their income on food. 
• Environmental restrictions are replm:ing acrt!age set-asides as the farm program OJtiJlement criteria. 
- Primary reasons are (1) growing importance of the environment on the national agenda and (2) 
increasing share of inputs purchased annually. The latter implies (1) input suppliers do not want 
production controlled and (2) controls on land become less effective in controlling total output. 
• Domestic feeding programs, notably food stamps, have replm:ed in part public stocks as policy 
m«:hanism to protect against high food prices. while crop insurance and !HI.l:H!.f. disaster assistance 
have augmented public stocks as a policy tool to protect against low farm income. 
- On average, consumers spend only 3% of their income on U.S. farm commodities. Farm 
commodity prices are relatively inconsequential to most consumers. Therefore, high food 
expenditure burden is a problem only for U.S. consumers who are poor. 
- Crop insurance aDd wide-spread use of ad hoc disaster assistance augment the farm income 
protection effect of public stocks (i.e., public stocks are purchased when prices are low). 
Important Current Evolutionary Agents 
• Parity of Farm Household Income (farm + nonfarm), exists on average with nonfarm household 
income. Low income no longer is an acceptable rationale for sector-wide farm programs. 
• The societal beM;f that farming is 1.1 political and economic foundl.ltion of this country (i.e., farm 
.fundiJmentl.llm) is incrt!IJSing djfficult to dqend. Farming now accounts for only approximately l.S% 
of U.S. economic activity and less than 2% of its population. 
Implication for Farm Policy Debate 
• Farm policy needs a new covenant based on ideas other than low farm income and farm fundamental-
ism. Two ideas appear viable: (1) reducing income risk induced by weather- the common citizen 
understands that farming is unique in this respect, and (2) compensl.ltory payments to farmers for 
environmental complitmce. Monitoring compliance with regulations of non-point pollution, such as 
occurs from farm land, is more difficult and expensive than monitoring and regulating point pollution, 
such as occurs from smokestacks. Thus, it may be less costly to attain environmental objectives in 
crop farming by enticing farmers to "voluntarily" adopt environmentally friendly rules rather than the 
traditional compliance approach. 
AN EVOLVING U.S. FARM AND FOOD POUCY: 
THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW COVENANT 
U.S. farm and food policy is a politically bipartisan social covenant which evolves 
to reflect changing relationships among competing policy actors and their socioeconomic 
environment. These changing relationships have generated three important long-term 
evolutionary trends in the policy instruments used to implement the historic farm and 
food policy covenant. However, two new evolutionary agents affect the essence of this 
-
covenant, not just the way in which it is implemented. Each of these evolutionary 
considerations are discussed in this article with special attention to their significance for 
the debate on the 1995 farm and food legislation. 
HisToRICALLY IMPoRTANT FARM PouCY Acro:u 
Seven policy actors have continuously participated in farm and food policy debates 
since farm price and income support became an integral component of farm and food 
policy in the 1930s. These seven actors are program commodity producers, input 
suppliers, output handlers, users and processors, consumers, food aid advocates, 
taxpayers, and environmentalists. Each of these actors has several objectives relative to 
farm and food policy, but each also has a clearly defined central objective(s). 
The major objective of program commodity producers is high, stable farm income 
(Table 1). High farm income occurs when prices and output are high. High farm 
income in tum stimulates farmers to purchase large quantities of farm inputs. Higher net 
income for farm input suppliers result. 
TABLE 1: IMPoRTANT U.S. FARM AND FOOD PoUCY ACTORS AND 
'fBEIR MAJoR Poucy OBJECTIVE(s) 
Actor 
Program Commodity Producers 
Input Suppliers 
Output Handlers, Users, 
& Processors 
Consumers 
Food Aid Advocates 
Taxpayers 
Environmentalists 
Major Policy Objective(s) 
High, Stable Farm Income 
High Farm Input Purchases 
High Output Volume & Low 
Commodity Input Prices 
Safe, Adequate Food at 
"Reasonable Prices" 
Food Access by the Poor 
Low Government Costs 
Resource Sustainability 
Output handlers, users, and processors prefer low farm prices and high farm 
output. The former means low input costs for output users and processors, including 
livestock producers; while the latter means a larger volume of business activity for output 
handlers and processors. Higher income for output handlers, users, and processors 
result. Low prices and high farm output also increase access to food for the poor by 
putting downward pressure on food prices and increasing the likelihood of surplus food 
distribution programs. 
The major objective of consumers is safe, adequate food at "reasonable prices." 
It is commonly argued that consumers want low farm prices. However, their behavior 
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during the last 25 years suggests they are more concerned with avoiding high prices than 
with paying low prices. For example, during the price explosion of the early 1970s 
consumers become vocal about rising food prices. In contrast, during the 1980s consum-
ers in general did not lobby for lower farm price supports despite substantial surpluses. 
Taxpayers prefer minimum government spending, which translates into low taxes. 
The level of farm prices is an important determinant of the pressure to expend govern-
ment spending on food and farm programs. High prices generate pressure from consum-
ers, food aid advocates, and output handlers, users, and processors for public expendi-
tures to expand production as well as public stock holding activities. In contrast, low 
prices generate pressure from producers and input suppliers for expanded income support. 
From the 1930s through 1970, the policy actors who are now termed environmen-
talists primarily focused on using farm programs as a tool to conserve land, especially 
soil. However, since the early 1970s, they have become concerned with a broader array 
of resource degradation problems as they relate to farming, notably water quality. They 
also have become concerned that farm programs may encourage the intensive use of land 
and may increase the use of fertilizer and pesticides, both effects which environmentalists 
feel negatively impact soil and water quality. 
Historic Farm and Food Polley Covenant 
Objectives of the farm policy actors are in conflict. It is not possible to have low 
farm prices for output handlers, users, and processors; high farm prices for program 
commodity producers and input suppliers; allow farm operators freedom to make their 
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own production and marketing decisions; and attain efficient use of scare resources. 
Despite the complex trade-offs, the political interplay of these seven actors has defined 
the historic U.S. covenant on farm and food policy. The compromise covenant involves: 
(1) protection against low farm income (whether caused by structural adjustments to 
excessive resources in farming or unexpected bearish market events) via price supports 
and income payments, (2) protection against high food expenditures via public stocks and 
domestic feeding programs, (3) protection against high federal budget costs by requiring 
farmers to remov.e land from production in order to qualify for farm program benefits, 
and (4) protection against resource degradation via technical assistance, cost sharing for 
soil erosion control, and, more recently, environmental compliance provisions. This 
covenant does not allow any of the seven actors to attain their major farm policy 
objective, but it does provide protection against an outcome they want to avoid1• 
LoNG-TERM EVOLUTIONARY TRENDs IN PoUCY INSTRUMENTS 
The policy objectives of the historic farm and food policy covenant has changed 
little since it was first enacted during the 1930s. However, the policy instruments used to 
obtain the objectives have evolved to reflect changes in the socioeconomic conditions of 
1 Many other farm policy actors are concerned that the historic farm and food policy 
covenant generates distortions which negatively affect them. Three are especially prominent 
at present: exporters to the U.S., U.S. export competitors, and rural development advocates. 
The first two are concerned that barriers to trade erected as a result of U.S. farm programs, 
such as quotas on imports into the U.S. and export promotion programs, reduce their 
exports. Rural development advocates are concerned that, with a limited federal budget, 
farm programs may siphon funds from other needs of rural society, such as assistance for the 
rural poor, infrastructure, and non-farm economic development. 
4 
the various actors. Three important evolutionary trends in policy instruments are 
discussed in this section. 
Direct income payments to producers have largely replaced farm commodity price 
supports as the policy instrument used to protect against low farm income. 
Prior to 1960, the primary mechanism used to protect against low farm income 
was the government's accumulation of stocks whenever market prices declined below the 
support price. Because the support price tended to be higher than the market clearing 
-
price, price supports encouraged production while discouraging both domestic consump-
tion and exports. The net result was the accumulation of public stocks. 
During the late 1950s/early 1960s, public stocks became excessive, resulting in 
substantial federal expenditures. A policy debate ensued in which most farm groups 
defended price supports. However, as time passed, the deciding arguments became (1) a 
desire to increase exports and (2) the concern that, by raising the price of food, price 
supports are a tax on consumers, especially the poor. Poor consumers especially are 
affected by higher prices because they spend more of their income on food. 
During the early- and mid-1960s, price supports were replaced in part by income 
supports provided through paid land set asides. During the 1970s, deficiency payments 
became the primary mechanism for providing direct income support. The Food Security 
Act of 1985, which was driven in part by a buildup in stocks and a decline in exports, 
confirmed this trend to deficiency payments by reducing price support loan rates below 
market clearing price levels. 
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Environmental restrictions are replacing acreage set-asides as the fann program entitle-
ment criteria. 
Farm price and income support programs are entitlements. Thus, anyone who 
meets the program qualifying criteria can receive the benefits. The traditional entitlement 
criteria is that the farm operator set aside a percent of the acreage historically planted to 
the program commodity. The set-aside is a co-payment in the sense that the operator 
reduces production of a surplus commodity thereby decreasing government cost. 
mstorically, farm operators were viewed as good environmental stewards, but the 
growing concern for the environment during the 1970s and 1980s caused this view to be 
questioned. At the same time, society began to reveal in its policy decisions that it no 
longer considered farming a unique industry and therefore exempt from many regulations 
previously imposed upon non-farm industries. An example is the adoption of farm labor 
laws. 
Reinforcing these trends is the increasing substitution of inputs purchased annual-
ly, notably pesticides, fertilizers, and improved seed, for land and operator household 
labor in producing crops. Consequently, an increasing number of input suppliers want 
more acres planted to crops. This economic interest conflicts with the traditional farm 
policy perspective of retiring land in order to control government expenditures. 
The confluence of environmental concerns and increasing reliance on annually 
purchased inputs has laid the foundation for potentially replacing supply controls with 
environmental restrictions as the farm program entitlement criteria. A bellwether of this 
evolution is the requirement that by 1995 farm operators have implemented a soil 
conservation program for their highly erodible land in order to qualify for farm program 
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benefits. The growing importance of the environment on the national agenda and 
increasing importance of annually purchased inputs suggest that environmental restrictions 
eventually will replace set asides as the entitlement criterion. 
Domestic feeding programs, notably food stamps, have replaced in part public stocks as 
policy mechanism to protect against high food prices, while crop insurance and ad hoc 
disaster assistance have augmented public stocks as a policy tool to protect against low 
farm income. 
In the late 1940s, the U.S. farm value of food accounted for approximately 12 
percent of expenditures by U.S. consumers. Because of increases in farm productivity 
and per capita income, the farm value of food now accounts for only 3 percent of 
expenditures by U.S. consumers. Psychographic studies reveal that price and income are 
the dominant determinant of food purchases for only about 10 percent of Americans. For 
the remaining 90 percent lifestyle is a more important determinant. Furthermore, exports 
account for 20-25 percent of U.S. farm output. Food security (i.e., assured access to 
food) for U.S. consumers is assured by opportunities to reduce exports or livestock feed 
use. Consequently, food security for U.S. consumers no longer is a question of quantity 
and price of farm commodities. Instead, it is primarily a question of the consumer's 
income. Thus, food security is a problem only for low income consumers. 
These factors have combined to create a trend toward food security being handled 
through income transfers which facilitate the purchase of sufficient quantity of food by 
low income consumers rather than through the accumulation of public stocks. This trend 
began with the initiation of a food stamp program during the early 1960s. At present, 
one in ten Americans receives food stamps, the largest share ever. 
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This trend toward reducing the role of public stocks in food assistance has 
paralleled the growing use of crop insurance and ad hoc disaster assistance as tools to 
protect against low farm income. These disaster-related programs augment the income 
protection effect of public stocks on farm income (i.e., public stocks are purchased when 
prices are low). This trend suggests that the policy arena is rethinking the role of public 
stocks as a tool for protecting against low farm income. 
These two trends do not mean that there is no role for public stocks. Studies have 
reached conflicting conclusions regarding whether the private sector alone will hold a 
socially optimal level of stocks. Nevertheless, these trends do suggest that the role of 
public stocks will be smaller in the future. 
IMPoRTANT CUltR.ENT EvOUJTIONARY AGENTS 
While the policy mechanisms used to implement the farm and food policy 
covenant have evolved over time to reflect changing socioeconomic conditions, the right 
of farmers to receive protection against low income has rarely been questioned to any 
significant degree in the political arena. The primary reasons were (1) that farmers were 
perceived to be economically disadvantaged and (2) farm fundamentalism, a belief that 
farming is the political, social, and economic foundation of the U.S. However, these two 
rationales are increasingly being scrutinized because they deviate substantially from 
reality in the 1990s. 
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Parity of Household Income 
When farm price and income support programs were first started, farmers were 
clearly an economically disadvantaged class. For example, in 1933 per capita income of 
the farm population was 33 percent of the per capita income of the nonfarm population. 
While comparable per capita income data does not exist for recent years, national 
statistics reveal that the average income of U.S. farm households (farm plus nonfarm 
income) is on par with the average income of U.S. nonfarm households. The reasons for 
this substantial change in the economic status of farm families are the massive exodus of 
farm labor and the growth of part-time farming. 
Farm FundamentaUsm? 
Farming now accounts for only 1.5% of U.S. economic activity and less than 2% 
of its population. It requires tremendous hubris to suggest that such a small component 
of the U.S. remains the moral or cultural foundation of this country. 
IMPuCADONS FOR FARM AND FOOD PoLICY 
The current debate over farm price and income support programs is commonly 
attributed to the federal budget deficit and a changing set of national priorities. This 
argument ignores the more basic debate with regard to the questionable validity of the 
foundation arguments which have historically underpinned society's willingness to support 
farm income. This argument also ignores the concurrent evolution of new foundational 
rationales for society's continued support of the farming sector. ~ is reducing the 
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income risk which farmers face because of yield variability caused by weather and pest. 
The second is compensating farmers for environmemal regulatory costs or for reducing 
the use of fertilizers and pesticides. 
Both of these evolving rationales meet the three key attributes which rationales for 
farm support must possess in the socioeconomic and political climate of the U.S. in the 
1990s. First, a foundation argument must be simple in concept. Complex concepts and 
ideas will fall upon deaf ears due to the limited attention span of the U.S. public and to a 
belief that complexity hides other motives. Second, a foundation argument must reflect 
the convictions of the times. Because farming no longer is considered unique, its policy 
initiatives must fall under the broader social and political issues of the time. Third, 
because farming no longer has enough sheer political power to force its will onto center 
stage, a foundation argument must have a solid underpinning in economic fact. 
The common citizen understands that farmers face risk because of weather. This 
understanding is continually reinforced by media coverage of droughts, flooding, frost, 
and other natural phenomenon. Reducing income risk caused by natural disaster falls 
under the current conviction that government should compensate citizens for damage 
caused by uncontrollable events. This conviction is illustrated by the availability of low-
interest loans after natural disasters such as earthquakes and hurricanes as well as the 
current debate over catastrophic health insurance. Note, this rationale does not support 
the concept of income insurance for farmers because it does not encompass non-weather-
related causes of income variation, such as unexpected changes in foreign and domestic 
demand. 
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Turning to compensatory payments, it is widely accepted that monitoring compli-
ance with regulations of non-point-source pollution, such as occurs from farm land, is 
more difficult and expensive than monitoring regulations of point-source pollution, such 
as occurs from a smokestack. This is further compounded by the need to monitor a large 
number of individual operators in farming relative to other industries. These arguments 
suggest it may be less costly to attain environmental objectives in crop farming by 
economically enticing farmers to "voluntarily" adopt environmentally friendly practices. 
The "voluntary" compliance approach is being used with regard to conservation compli-
ance, and it appears that the majority of acres planted to crops which now receive price 
and income supports will meet conservation compliance requirements by 1995. 
In conclusion, both of the evolving foundation arguments are extensions of policy 
shifts which have been emerging for a decade. Nevertheless, adopting either of these two 
ideas as the foundation for public income payments to farmers results in a very different 
program than the current income and price support programs. Protection against 
weather-related risks leads to some combination of crop insurance, ad hoc disaster 
assistance, and/or other risk-related policy instruments. Compensatory payments for 
environmental compliance suggests that deficiency payments and price supports should be 
replaced by a per acre payment determined by the value of the environmental benefits to 
society and should be extended to all crops. Both foundation arguments are currently 
being debated and their resolution is uncertain, but evolutionary policy trends suggest that 
these arguments will prevail and that farm support, although in a different form, will 
continue well into the 21• century. 
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